In this paper we investigate labour market trends in South Africa between October 1995 and March 2003. In particular, we evaluate the South African government's claim that over this period, the economy created two million net new jobs. Using the same household survey data as that used to generate official employment estimates, we also find an almost two million net increase in employment. However, we show that this increase is likely to have been inflated by changes in data capture and definitions of employment over the years, and that the real increase may be considerably less, with a lower bound of approximately 1.4 million jobs. We argue further that the rise in employment over the period must be evaluated in the context of a dramatically larger growth in labour supply and therefore rising rates of unemployment, declining real earnings, and an increase in the number of the working poor, particularly among Africans.
INTRODUCTION
There has been much debate in South Africa over the past decade concerning national employment and unemployment statistics (see, for example, Standing et al, 1996; Bhorat, 1999; Klasen and Woolard, 1999; Schlemmer and Levitz, 1999; Nattrass, 2000) .
This followed the introduction in the 1990s of household surveys that for the first time in the country captured detailed information on individual employment status. The debate about statistics intensified more recently in the run-up to the 2004 national election. The statement by the ANC government that "the economy created two million net new jobs since 1995" based on these surveys, in particular provoked considerable discussion in the media as to whether these trends are credible.
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With the growing recognition of very high (and increasing) rates of unemployment in the country, and reports of firms engaging in large-scale retrenchments, it is perhaps not surprising that statistics, which suggest an increase in employment of this magnitude, are met with controversy and disbelief. Furthermore, in 2000 a new household survey (the Labour Force Survey) was introduced which was designed to capture all forms of work with greater efficiency. More specifically, increased emphasis was placed on classifying as employed those engaged in informal activities and smallscale agriculture, even if for only one hour in the previous week. This has confounded the debate because it could be argued that the increase in employment is not real, but rather is an artefact of changing definitions and improved data collection.
Our objective in this paper is to evaluate the claim that two million net new jobs were created between 1995 and 2003, drawing on the same data sources as those used to generate official estimates on employment. We begin by assessing the validity of this finding, given the problems with measuring employment status consistently across the years using national household survey data. We show that, taken at face value, recorded employment did indeed increase by close to two million jobs over this eight-year period.
Even if a sizeable part of this increase is real, however, we explain why it is very likely that some (not inconsiderable) portion is the result of changes in definitions and data capture.
We argue further that in evaluating the government's claim of job creation there are other factors, beyond the verification of statistics, which need to be highlighted for a more complete picture of labour market trends in South Africa. This paper adds to the debate by exploring three of these: the types of employment that have increased; the magnitude of the employment increase in relation to the growth in labour supply; and the changes in earnings that have accompanied the rise in employment. The SEE, conducted since 1998 2 , attempts to capture employment from the firm side. Before 2002 however an outdated sample of firms was covered such that the employment growth in rapidly expanding sectors (information technology, for example)
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was not picked up. In 2002 the sample of firms was redrawn to take into account the changing structure of the economy (SSA, 2000; . Another key downfall of the SEE is that only formal (registered) non-agricultural businesses are sampled and therefore no information on informal, agricultural and domestic work is captured. As we show in section 2 below, these types of employment constitute a substantial part of total
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The SEE was piloted in the third quarter of 1997 and was "in operation from the first quarter in 1998" (SSA, 2004:4) . employment in South Africa, and the SEE consequently cannot be used to identify trends in aggregate employment.
While the national household surveys conducted by SSA are considered to provide the most reliable and comprehensive picture of the South African labour market from the 1990s onwards, there are still problems with the surveys. The most significant of these for a study of employment trends is that questions relating to an individual's employment status changed over the years and particularly with the crossover to the LFS in 2000.
The LFS provides a far more detailed explanation of what constitutes a job, with the aim of capturing irregular and informal work more thoroughly than was the case in the OHS.
The LFS questionnaires have emphasised in particular that all small-scale activities, including subsistence agriculture, should be classified as work, even if the individual was engaged in the activity for only an hour in the previous week. Any study of labour market trends in South Africa therefore should recognise that included in the LFS employment numbers are a group of workers that previously would have been classified as unemployed or inactive.
Although most of the changes in survey design came with the introduction of the LFS, some changes were also made within the OHS series that complicate the comparability of these data. In the earlier OHSs (up to the 1995 survey), no prompt was provided for respondents explaining what should be viewed as work; from 1996, however a prompt was included. Importantly, as part of the description of what counts as work, the later OHSs specified that own-account farming 3 should be reported as employment (Muller and Posel, 2004) . We would expect therefore that the later OHS employment estimates would include, in particular, subsistence farmers whose farming activities in the past would not have been counted or recognised as work. Respondents were prom pted to report as employment "work on a farm or land, whether for a wage or as part of the household's farming activities".
4 Historically there have been inconsistencies in the way SSA has treated those engaged in small-scale farming. There has been a tendency to classify small-scale farmers as inactive rather than as employed, and particularly in the case of women, whose farming activities may have been seen as an extension of their household work. (See Posel and Casale, 2001 for more details on how subsistence farmers were treated in the earlier population censuses.)
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS, 1995 -2003
In this section we evaluate the claim that the economy created two million net new jobs between October 1995 and March 2003, we investigate where employment has increased and we examine the rise in employment relative to the growth in labour supply. Our analysis is based on the same data from the OHS and LFS series used to generate official estimates on employment.
A two million net increase in employment?
The total employment figures in Second, we agree that a substantial part of the increase in employment may be 'real' in the sense that it is not a product of changing definitions of employment.
However, for the reasons outlined below, we do not think that the contribution of definitional changes to the growth in employment estimates can be so easily dismissed. Table 1 indicate, the increase in total employment would not be two million, but rather a little over 1.6 million. 8 It is not clear why subsistence farmers were identified in 1999 but not in 1997, given that the 1997 and the 1999 OHS questionnaires were identical. One possibility is that in 1999 enumerators were more carefully instructed to capture subsistence farming as employment.
(For further discussion of estimates of subsistence farming using household survey data, see Posel and Casale, 2001; Aliber, 2003; Casale, 2003 and Muller and Posel, 2004.) counts as work is self-employment among individuals in the informal sector. Individuals whose 'business' or employment is unstable or marginal are most likely to have been overlooked by the earlier surveys, especially as respondents themselves might not have considered these survivalist activities as being real work.
The number of individuals self-employed in the non-agricultural informal sector grew from 447 800 to 898 600 over the period October 1995 to October 1999, an increase of just over 100 percent. If we were to be conservative, therefore, and ignore both the rise in informal sector self-employment from 1999 to 2000 when the survey changeover took place (229 900 jobs), as well as the growth in subsistence farming captured after 1995 (300 000 jobs), we would arrive at a 'lower bound' for the net increase in employment of approximately 1.4 million jobs over the eight-year period.
Where has employment increased?
Concerns about the data aside, perhaps a more important focus in evaluating the 'job increase claim' is what types of recorded jobs have grown over the period, rather than how many new jobs have been recorded. In his defence of the government's interpretation of employment estimates, Erwin (2004) stresses that the claim is not that "the two million net new jobs are all goods jobs in the formal sector". 11 Perhaps more
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There was a substantial increase in self -employment in the informal sector between 1995 and 1997 (an additional 104 400 individuals).
While a more explicit prompt for what counts as work was included after 1995, perhaps accounting for some of the increase between 1995 and 1997, the OHS 1997 and OHS 1999 questionnaires were identical in the way in which they elicited information on employment. Unless the enumerators themselves placed more emphasis on capturing informal activities, this would suggest that a large part of the increase in the informal sector over this earlier period is likely to be real.
10 The tapering off of growth in informal self -employment from 2000 onwards may suggest that this type of informal sector employment is reaching the limit on its absorptive capacity. However, the trend needs to be reassessed when the LFS data are reweighted using more recent weights derived from the 2001 population census.
11 Erwin (2004) cont inues: "We do not claim we are solving the employment problem. Government's 10-year review and the ANC's election manifesto express concern about some effects of casualisation and outsourcing on the standards of living of workers and deal with the need to create more employment. But the bottom line is that there has been significant job growth since the mid-1990s". Note that we accurately, this could be restated as "less than half of the new jobs are jobs in the formal sector".
Between 1995 The figures in Table 1 show that approximately 750 000 of this total 2.2 million increase in employment reflects the growth in informal sector self-employment; and almost 300 000 derives from the expansion in domestic work. Between 1995 and therefore, more than one million additional jobs were 'created' in self-employment in the informal sector or in domestic work in private households; when subsistence farmers are included then this rises to 1.35 million.
It is likely that most of the remaining 850 000 increase in total recorded employment reflects growth in the formal sector, although we cannot be certain. The In sum, if we take the data at face value, then the growth in formal sector employment, although not inconsiderable, accounts for less than forty percent of the total number of new jobs in the economy. 12 It could also be misleading to claim all of the increase in employment as the 'creation' of work by the economy. The considerable rise in the number of people who are self-employed in the informal sector would perhaps more adequately describe a situation where a growing number of individuals, unable to find regular paid employment, have been 'making work' for themselves -even if, as we show in section 3, the returns to this work are low and variable.
cannot use the household survey data to explore what portion of the increase in employment is associated with the outsourcing of wo rk (see Esselaar, 2003 for further discussion).
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Using a lower bound estimate of the total employment change (by excluding subsistence farmers captured after 1995 and the additional informal sector self -employed workers captured between 1999 and 2000), formal sector growth accounts for, at most, 47 percent of the new jobs recorded in the economy.
The increase in labour supply
The reported increase in employment cannot be considered in isolation from the dramatic increase in labour supply over the eight-year period. Taking the employment data as reported in the household surveys, Table 2 shows that the total economically active population based on a strict definition of unemployment (those actively searching for work) grew by more than five million individuals. Less than forty percent of these 'additional' labour force participants, who wanted to work and looked for work, actually found employment. 13 When the labour force is expanded to include the non-searching unemployed (the broad definition of unemployment) then the increase in labour supply is close to 6.5 million, meaning that less than a third of the growth in labour supply translated into an increase in employment.
14 Estimates are for all labour force participants aged between 15 and 65 years. The searching unemployed were identified as those who were willing to accept work and had actively searched for work in the four weeks prior to being interviewed.
The net increase in employment, whether it is estimated conservatively at 1.4 million or at almost two million jobs, has therefore been significantly smaller than the net increase in unemployment over the period. As a result, rates of unemployment have risen dramatically. In 1995, 17 percent of all economically active individuals were unemployed according to the strict definition of unemployment, and 29 percent according to the broad definition; in 2003 this had increased to 32 percent and 43 percent respectively.
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With cross -sectional household survey data, it is not possible to identify churning in the labour market and therefore to establish exactly how many new labour market entrants found employment over the period.
14 Note that these unemployment figures may differ from those published by SSA as we have made some adjustments to ensure that the definitions of strict and broad unemployment are consistent across the years (see Casale and Posel, 2002 and Casale, 2003 for details of these adjustments).
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INCREASE IN EMPLOYMENT
When evaluating trends in the labour market in South Africa, a more inclusive description is provided by looking not only at changes in employment and unemployment, but also at the returns that employment offers. Is income earned or generated sufficient to lift individuals (let alone families) out of poverty?
In These aggregate figures mask considerable differences by type of employment. Table 3 16 shows that income earned in the informal sector and in domestic work is significantly lower than income earned in the formal sector, and furt hermore that the gap has widened over time. For example, between 1997 (the first year for which we can identify total employment in the informal sector) and 2003, the ratio of earnings from informal sector and domestic work to earnings from formal sector work decreased from 0.66 to 0.40. This is because nominal (let alone real) earnings in the informal sector (among both employees and the self-employed) fell over this period, and domestic workers' wages fell in real terms. Among formal sector employees, earnings do not seem to have changed significantly over the period in real terms, while among those in formal self-employment there was a significant net decline over the period.
Particularly noteworthy is that the largest relative fall in average real earnings occurred in the category of employment that has shown the greatest job growthinformal sector self-employment. In 2003 average real earnings among this group of the employed stood at less than a third of their 1995 value. Just as part of the recorded growth in informal sector self-employment may not be real, so part of the fall in average returns to this employment may be due to the more efficient capture of low-paid work.
The introduction of the LFS in 2000 was associated with a substantial drop in earnings in informal sector self-employment. However, greater competition in self-employment over
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Where respondents did not report an absolute earnings figure, we used the midpoint of the earnings bracket into which their income fell.
16 Earnings in 1999 have been excluded from the series in Table 3 as the OHS questionnaire in that year only asked for the gross earnings of all those in self -employment, whereas in the other surveys used in this analysis earnings net of expenses are available.
the eight-year period, and an increase in survivalist activity, would also be expected to depress earnings. The limited earnings power of the self-employed in the informal sector is clearly visible in the earnings distribution graph below. While there is some potential for individuals to earn high returns in this type of employment, the distribution is strongly skewed towards the lower end of the earnings distribution and has shifted further to the left between 1995 and 2003. A large and growing number of working individuals in South Africa are not able to escape poverty through employment. Rather, the increase in employment in South Africa has been associated with a considerable rise in the number of the working poor.
In Table 4 we report the incidence of poverty amongst the employed using two poverty lines. The first is a very conservative estimate based on $2 a day (equal to R420 per Whichever poverty line is adopted the extent of poverty among the employed is shown to have increased considerably. In fact, over the eight-year period, the number
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We are assuming an exchange rate of $1 = R7 and a month of 30 days.
of the employed living in poverty more than doubled: from just over 900 000 to approximately two million individuals based on the conservative poverty line; and from 1.6 million to 3.2 million using the more generous line. In 2003, almost twenty percent of those with employment were earning less than the equivalent of $2 a day, and almost 30 percent reported earnings that were lower than the minimum wage for a domestic worker. In light of the earnings data presented above, it is not surprising that the extent of poverty among those with informal sector self-employment is particularly high and that it increased significantly over the period. Between 1995 and 2003, the number of these workers whose real income was less than $2 a day expanded by more than 500 Table 4 therefore we present two further estimates of poverty -one for all the employed excluding those with self-employment in the informal sector, and one that excludes subsistence farmers. As expected, the incidence of poverty falls for both these measures, but still approximately 16 percent of the restricted samples of the employed report earnings below our conservative poverty line.
Income earned through employment forms a significant part of the population's access to resources (see, for example, Leibbrandt, Bhorat and Woolard, 2001 ).
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Between 1995 and 2003, the decline in average earnings has been relatively greater than the net increase in employment. As a result, the total monthly wage or earnings bill in real terms has fallen, from approximately R29 billion in 1995 to R27.3 billion in
2003. In Table 5 we highlight the implications of this fall. The above exercise illustrates a fall in the total size of the 'earned income' pie in the country. However, the fall has not been evenly distributed across all South Africans.
We conclude this section by briefly considering labour market trends and earnings across the four population groups in South Africa.
The disaggregated data provided in Table 6 highlight large inequalities across labour market participants. These inequalities are most pronounced between Africans and whites. In 1995, total employment among Africans was more than 200 percent
State transfers (particularly the Old Age Pension (OAP), the child support grant and disability grants) are another key component of total resources in a household. However, data on the value of this income received are not captured in the national household surveys.
20 Those of pension age are excluded from the calculations here as it is assumed that they receive a pension (if not private then the OAP), and are thus not dependent on income from the employment of working-age individuals.
greater than total employment among whites. However, the gap in average monthly real earnings across these groups was even larger -employed whites earned almost 250 percent more than employed Africans. Consequently, the total monthly real earnings bill accruing to whites was greater than that accruing to Africans (R13 billion compared to R12.3 billion).
Between 1995 and 2003, total employment among both Africans and whites increased, but the increase was much larger among Africans (1.6 million compared to approximately 26 000). The estimate for Africans may be biased upwards because they are over-represented in those categories of employment (subsistence farming and informal sector self-employment) that have been captured more efficiently as the surveys have progressed (Casale, 2003) . Furthermore, although unemployment rates increased by relatively more among whites over the period, this was from a far lower base, and rates of unemployment among Africans remained much higher. In 2003, 50
percent of all economically active Africans were unemployed according to the broad definition compared to ten percent of whites.
Average real earnings for both population groups also decreased, but the fall was significantly greater for Africans (25 percent compared to 7.2 percent). The growth in employment was not sufficient to offset the drop in real earnings and the total monthly real earnings bill therefore decreased for both Africans and whites (and by relatively more for Africans).
Over the same period, the total population aged younger than 65 years fell slightly among whites (although by relatively less than the drop in the total real earnings bill), but it increased by more than five million among Africans. Consequently, There have been some improvements, on average, in labour market outcomes for the other two population groups. Average real earnings for both Indians and coloureds with employment rose, although not significantly. Total employment among these groups also grew, and as a result, the total real earnings bill increased. This increase was greater than that for the total population younger than 65 years, and average per capita real earned income therefore rose for both Indians (from R1548 to Even if we were to accept that all of the reported increase in employment is real, however, the claim of job growth cannot be presented without considerable further qualification. Less than half of the total number of 'new' jobs recorded reflects employment in the formal sector; more than half therefore is accounted for by an increase particularly in self-employment in the informal sector, in domestic work, and in subsistence farming, all types of work associated with very low returns.
The growth in employment also must be considered in the context of a dramatically larger increase in labour supply among working-age individuals. Over the eight-year period, less than a third of the increase in labour supply (broadly defined) In sum, claims of rising employment in South Africa cannot be assessed in isolation from a significantly larger rise in unemployment, the growth particularly of informal sector self-employment, and declining average real earnings chiefly among
Africans.
